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NIETZSCHE ON ENVY
GARY SHAPIRO

A recent newspaper story suggests a significant change in the attitude of
some baseball fans. While the phenomenon of harassment of players from the
stands is not new, there seems to be a new spirit behind the hurling of bottles
and other dangerous debris. Whereas such attacks were once motivated by
scorn for poor performance or by a violent enthusiasm for the opposing team,
spectators are now also apparently moved by envy. They are, according to a
number of sportswriters, jealous and resentful of the high salaries and prestige
of professional ballplayers. No doubt envy is an ancient phenomenon, but it is
not one much discussed in recent moral philosophy. Both the neglect and the
signs that it is becoming an increasingly large problem of personal and social life
(I'll later be adding more to what might be taken to be the merely idiosyncratic
behavior of sports fans) suggest the need for an analysis of its motives, dynamics
and possible antidotes. Nietzsche seems to be one of the few modern thinkers
who have devoted much attention to envy after the scholastics' �ttempt at an
encyclopedic and systematic account of the virtues and vices .I Nietzsche's con
cern with the subject is much more pervasive than is suggested by the scanty
references to Neid and its derivatives in Schlechta's index; moreover, his analysis
must be distinguished from the treatment of the allied concept of ressentiment
which has generated much attention. (For example, envy is discussed at least
fourteen times in Human, All-Too-Human, appropriately enough.)2
It is necessary to distinguish envy from some similar attitudes with which it
is often confused. To describe envy as a disturbance or distress caused by the
good fortune of another would not be sufficiently precise. One might be
disturbed at another's success and so propelled into an attempt to emulate or
surpass the other's achievement, as a young runner might set as a standard for
himself the records of a champion. This is the distinction, familiar to Aristotle,
between envy and emulation or ambition. Envy must also be distinguished
from jealousy. The jealous person resents the achievement of another because
he believes that he deserves (or equally deserves) the reward or recognition in
question. I am jealous of you for having obtained a job for which I believe that I
have equal or better qualifications or I am jealous that you have received more
applause than I when my performance in the play was equally good.J Envy ex
ists when I simply resent your good fortune, your achievement or your recogni
tion as such, without any thought that it is properly mine or that I might, with
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effon, become worthy of the same. This is the emotion which is close to Nietz·
sche's ressentiment; it is a strictly re-active attitude which finds another's good as
such to be despicable or disgusting. In John Rawls's formulation, to which

remind him of his distress at not having the thing that he lacks or at not being
the person who he is not. Nevenheless the imagined superiority of the envied
person will "torment and bend us the worst" for imagination will dwell on and

�

exaggerate the properties of the envied figure. Envy can become self·

N etzsche ':ould subscribe, "we may think of envy as the propensity to view
.
wtth hosnhty the greater good of others even though their being more for·
tunate than we are does not detract from our advantages."4

reinforcing, for his reluctance to confront the actual figure will lead the envious
one to further exaggeration and further avoidance behavior. Elsewhere
Nietzsche says:

In order to understand what Nietzsche thinks about envy or, for that mat·
t�r about any other significant topic it is necessary to see how the concept is ex·

Ordinary envy is wont to cackle when the envied hen has laid an egg, thereby relieving

•

�tbtted and dramatized in his writings. For Nietzsche philosophical analysis is
.

mseparable from the structure, style, and rhetorical context of what is said. I
think we can make a first approach to the concept of envy by examining a
chapter from Thus Spoke Zaratbustra, the most obviously narrative, dramatic and

rhetorical of his writings. In the first part there is a section called "Of the Tree
on the Mountainside" which may appear somewhat puzzling until it is realized
that envy is the crucial notion around which this particular slice of the drama

revolves. The form of the chapter is that of a parable or metaphor in which
Zarathustra uses the tree as a way of understanding the condition of an envious

youth. As Zarathustra says later, "Whenever your spirit wants to speak in
parables or metaphors (Gleicbnisse) pay heed, for that is when your virtue has its
origin and beginning."5

itself and becoming milder. But there
�

(

By speaking to the youth Zarathustra aims at breaking this downward spiral of

I
(

ing of him," he replies, standing up in confusion. That is, he confirms both

J

1

I

woman who makes the notorious remark about the whip); and no doubt there
are those who are indifferent to him. Why should anyone deliberately avoid
Zarathustra? Zarathustra himself throws some light on this question in his first
sp�ech. The situation of that speech is that by wandering through the moun
tams, he has come across the young man in question leaning against a tree and
gazing wearily into the valley. Grasping the tree Zarathustra begins his parable:

is not gratified. Silent envy grows in silence.'

silent envy.
The youth confirms the analysis: "I hear Zarathustra and I was just think·
Zarathustra's belief that his avoidance was the product of obsession rather than
indifference and the principle of emotional action at a distance, for it seems to
him that his thoughts have somehow led to Zarathustra's appearance. With so
calm the youth's alarm he says:

"Now it is with men as with this tree.
''The more it wants to rise into the heights and the light, the more determinedly do its

lI
l

roots strive earthward, downwards, into the darkness, into the depths-into evil."

There are several forms of envy and a number of allied attitudes. Of the latter,
the one which receives the most extensive treatment in Nietzsche's work is the

ressentiment of the weak and ill-favored against those who are strong and well
turned out. This is a moral stance which begins with a sense of antithetical
values. Nietzsche calls these "good and evil" in The Genealogy of Morals to
distinguish the attitude from the self-affirming attitude of the "good" for whom
the "bad" is merely a secondary concept. The envy described here is not of that
son. Rather it is one which begins by wanting to "rise into the heights and the

"If I wanted to shake this tree with my hands I should be unable to do it.
"But the wind, which we cannot see, torments it and bends it where it wishes. It

this desire

much established, Zarathustra's parable takes another turn. After seeking to

The chapter begins with Zarathustra's noticing that a young man has been
avoiding him. This is rather unusual behavior even in the somewhat unclear

social world which we surmise in this book. Zarathustra has disciples and
.
enemtes here; he has those who would give him advice (the prophet and the old

is a yet deeper envy that in such a case becomes dead

silent, desiring that every mouth should be sealed and always more and more angry because

is invisi·

ble hands that torment and bend us the worst. "•

The tree is moved by that which is not visible or tangible. Like natural motion,
social and psychological motion (emotion) need not be a response to pushes and
pulls which are obviously and grossly present. Envy is a paradigmatic case of
such emotional action at a distance. Whereas Jove, hate, and friendship presup·
pose some more or less regular contact with the one for whom the emotion is
felt, en�y may thrive on absence. It is quite possible to envy those with whom I
have little contact, because they are celebrated for their wealth, their

light"; that is, its first movement is an aspiration toward a goal. But there is a
funher distinction between envy and ressentiment. As a moral attitude ressenti·
ment does, although reactively, believe itself to be good, as the lambs that
Nietzsche imagines in The Genealogy of Morals take themselves to be the moral
antithesis of the evil birds or prey. Envy, on the contrary, may be relatively
devoid of rationalization and find itself forced, despite itself, into what it
regards as evil. " 'Yes, into evil!' cried the young man. 'How is it possible you
can uncover my soul?' " Sanre guesses that black masses and similar
phenomena may be conscious expressions of envy against God or the good, and

achievements or their power. (Of course I may also envy those with whom I

thus consciously evil. In this case the goal has been exemplified by Zarathustra.

the envted person and so the envier may seek to avoid a presence which would

depths-into evil." The particular form of evil here is that which is contained in

associat � more directly.) There is something disturbing about the presence of

But even a keen and noble aspiration may be frustrated and turn toward "the

6

the young man's explicit confession: "Behold, what have I been since you ap·
peared among us? It is envy of you which has destroyed me!" Frustrated aspira·
tions have a way of turning against those who have exemplified success in the
pursuit in question.
The evil of envy is that it wishes harm to the envied one even at the ex·
pense of the envier; it is willing to sacrifice its own good so as not to be con·
fronted with the good of the other. The extreme case would be the murders
cited by the sociologist Helmut Schoeck in his book on envy.1 In many cases
the envious murderers were scarcely acquainted with their victims, in any or·
dinary social sense of acquaintance. Here the envious one gives up his or her
own freedom, a great good, simply for the sake of eliminating the rival or
obstade.9 This is evil in the deepest sense, for it is not simply a choice of a
perverse or narrow good to the exclusion of a more genuine or inclusive one,
but the destruction or diminution of the goods in the situation without the
achievement of any alternative goods. Now Zarathustra's darkest saying about
such envy is his suggestion that this is a law of human life: "Now it is with men
as with this tree."1o Taken together with the ressentiment of those who have no
original aspirations, envy would appear to be not an occasional and unusual
vice but the lot of almost all human beings. Now it may be possible to minimize
certain kinds of envy in a system of political and economic justice like the one
proposed by John Rawls, in which every such advantage of the more highly
favored must be justified by its increasing the political and economic goods of
the less favored members of the society. Even here there are limits, however; if
half a society could become millionaires while the other half have their incomes
increased by one dollar a year, it seems very likely that envy would be in·
creased rather than diminished. In any case the causes of envy lie not only in
the distribution of political and economic goods but in the frustration of noble
aspirations or in an original feeling of worthlessness. Rawls suggests, without
much empirical evidence, that the latter can itself be minimized by a just
system of social arrangements. The former, involving such desires as those for
athletic or romantic or scientific success, has no obvious antidote.
Still the question remains why such a pattern of response should be con·
sidered typical rather than a deplorable and infrequent aberration.
Zarathustra's fullest answer to this question is in the chapter "On Redemption."
There all revenge is said to be "the will's antipathy toward time and time's 'It
was.' " The ontological source of revenge (Racbe), which I take to be inclusive of
both envy and ressentiment, is our apparent impotence in regard to the brute ac·
tuality of the past. However successful the will may be in overcoming a variety
of obstacles the sheer givenness of the past and our inability to change it leads
to the will's turning rancorously against some substitute (which might be itself).
Envy and ressentiment are often and ordinarily described as "dwelling on the
past.'' To be envious is to remain ftxated on real or imaginary slights, humilia·
tions, or contrasts of status which have already occurred. When envy ra·
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recognizes the almost unlimited forms of envy in this aphorism: "He is envious;
let us hope that he will not have children, for he would envy them because he
cannot be a child anymore."' J In Zarathustra's final reply to the youth he tells
him that because he still feels himself noble the others dislike him and "bose
Blicken senden"-"give him the evil eye." (Interestingly Hollingdale and Kauf
mann both miss the colloquial force of this expression in their translations; both
have Zarathustra speak of casting or sending "evil glances" which neglects the
systematic structure of beliefs of which "the evil eye" is a symptom).
Now we may think of societies with a pervasive belief in "the evil eye" as
quite different from our own or at least, as Rawls supposes, different from the
society which would be in accordance with our own deepest principles of
justice. Two factors, however, suggest that our sense of this difference may be
exaggerated. One is the epochal event of the death of God; the other is the
tendency in a time of shrinking resources and lower economic growth to adopt
a steady-state, zero-sum model of society according to which anyone's gain
must be someone else's loss. For Nietzsche these two factors can be
systematically interrelated through the concept of "the last man"; but let us
look at them separately for the time being.
Traditional religious belief may be interpreted as a device for minimizing.
envy. In so-called primitive societies there is often an enormous hostility
toward those who are different and a consequent fear of oneself being different
from others. According to Rene Girard, one typical way of controlling the
universal violence which might result from such �ensed differences is the ritual
of scapegoating, that is of killing, devouring, or punishing a specific person (or
animal substitute) which can be held to be significantly different· from all the
rest of the society.14 In its classical form scapegoating takes the form of
p�r�odically executing the sacred being whose kingship makes him uncannily
_ subjects. In a more general way the concept of a
dtstmct from all of hts
trans�endent God performs much the same social function. By being absolutely
supertor to all human beings, God is that which suggests our fundamental
brotherhood of solidarity. Such attitudes are typically reinforced by the idea of
a divine justice before which we are all fundamentally equal. In the absence of
such transcendent contrast, however, there are fewer obstacles to focussing on
the many differences between us. Accordingly the death of God ·leaves men
with only each other to look at and with a correspondingly accentuated sense of
their differences. In his talk "Of the Higher Man," Zarathustra says "'You
Higher Men'-thus the mob blink-'there are no Higher Men, we are all
equal, man is but man, before God-we are all equal!' . . . But now this God
has died." (Z, 297)
The belief in transcendent figures as a way of guaranteeing the equality of
a group, and therefore of warding off envy, has many extensions. Nietzsche
suggests that the cult of genius in the arts is a device for avoiding envy, for ex
ample: "the cult of genius fosters our vanity, our self-love, for it is only when

9

NIETZSCHE ON ENVY

GARY SHAPIRO

we think of it as very far removed from us, as a miracle, that it does not wound
us."lf It may be that the constant accessibility to the lives of actors and athletes
through the mass media has helped to destroy their aura of separateness and
has led to growth of envy like the one mentioned earlier in the changed

I

l
I

f
'

r

[

behavior of baseball fans.
Our own age is experiencing the tendency toward a steady-state society
which may, despite a higher degree of affiuence, come to bear some significant
structural analogies to the peasant village described by Lewis. To a large degree
this tendency is certainly due to shrinking resources and burgeoning popula
tion; but might it not also be a form of s�ciety which is likely to appeal to "the
last man" and in which "the last man" is likely to flourish?
"What is love? What is creation? .What is longing? What is a star?'' thus asks the last man
and blinks.
The earth hasbecome small, and upon it hops the last man, who makes everthing
small ....
Nobody grows rich or poor anymore: both are too much of a burden . . .

.

No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same:
whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse.

"The last man" makes everything small because he has no sense of nobility; a
society of "last men" will aim at equalizing the condition of all and of giving
envy a rational form. Once envy has been rationalized and institutionalized �he
_
one who thinks or wills differently will no longer be subJected to scapegoanng
or ostracism. It will be obvious that he does not fit into the levelled society and
so will voluntarily enter the madhouse. Here we might think of the somewhat
similar picture of the carceral society developed by Michel Foucault in
Discipline and Punish. Foucault traces the change in the practice of punishment
from the public ritual execution or degradation (wi�h many of the �eat�res. of
religious scapegoating) to the formation of the prtson as a .tot� msntunon
.
designed to regularize and render predictable the behav10r of 1ts mmates; that
is, to suppress all differences. Such institutions, significantly enough, are pro·
jected in an extreme form in Jeremy Bentham's vision of the Panopticon, a
building designed both for total surveillance of its inmates and to create among
the inmates the feeling of being under total surveillance.16 I think we ought to
regard Foucault's further suggestion that the Panopticon is the paradigmatic
social institution of our society not so much as a literal claim, but rather as a
warning similar to Zarathustra's vision of the last man. It shows us what life is
like when one attempts to enforce Bentham's principle that each is to count for

one and no more than one.
In the parable from which I have been taking increasingly lengthy excur·
.
sions the youth shows some capacity to be saved from the last extremity of
envy. After he breaks down in tears following his confession, Zarathustra
throws his arm around him and reminds the youth that he still "longs for the
open heights" and that his "soul thirsts for the stars." To some extent he takes
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pan in what Zarathustra will call, a few chapters later, radiant virtue (die scbenc

the agonistic spirit, which Nietzsche contrasts with the atomized li�e of mo ern

lO

�

men. The envy which is considered here is modern envy of the silent vanety.

kende Tugend). Radiant virtue is the inverse of envy; it is the virtue which cor

Nietzsche seems to imply that the stirrings of envy can be expressed through

responds to that vice. Whereas envy pulls into itself every cause for its own
hostility and dwells on these to exaggeration, the person of radiant virtue "is in

speech and action or that such expression can be restrained, with the conse

satiable in wanting to give." That person is an examplar, a tow�r of strength. In
today's language we talk of stars (of falm, or in other pursuits that are publically

quence that "silent envy grows in silence." In his advice "On War and
Warriors" Zarathustra says: "I know the hatred and envy of your hearts. You

known) and Zarathustra compares the figure of radiant vinue to the inexhausti

be ashamed of them!" (Z 7 3-74) Envy is indeed one of the seven deadly sins and

are not great enough not to know hatred and envy. So be great enough not to

ble radiance of the sun. Following this analogy the envious man is a black hole,
a star which has collapsed upon itself. He and it become evident to us only

one which it is extremely difficult to admit to either oneself or to others. One
typically denies one's own envy by complimenting the envied one or, as in the

through their destructive behavior. The envious man avoids contact but still acts

section we have just looked at, one keeps one's distance in the hope that the

at a distance by means of the evil eye. (Zarathustra says to the youth that "Bet

issue will not arise. If envy is indeed a human all too human emotion, we might

t� than your words, your eye tells me all your peril.") The youth is torn be

all do better to be less ashamed that we feel it.

tween envy and radiant virtue. Zarathustra describes this conflict in terms of

the metaphor of the prison; "you are still a prisoner who is plotting his

1 Some philosophical discussions of envy in the modern period are Hegel's disscussion of

freedom," he says. The youth has explained already how he is trapped in the

"The Animal Kingdom of the Spirit" in the Pbenomeno/ngy of Spirit and Kierkegaard's The Two Ages

prison formed by the distrust (or evil eye) of the others and his own distrust of

(translated as

himself. Even the free man of the spirit must purify himself, Zarathustra says,
for much of the prison remains within him and his eye must become pure. I think

The Present Age).

2 Part One: aphorisms 157,162,361,503,559; Part Two, I: 53,304,310,334,377,

that with Bentham's Panopticon and Foucault's carceral society in mind we can

383; Part Two, II: 27, 29,30, 244. Nietzsche is drawing to some extent on the writings of the

French moralists, notably La Rochefoucauld, who also discuss envy extensively. The topic is

read this advice to the youth as more than a simple injunction to noble aspira

treated extensively throughout Nietzsche's writing.

tion. It also contains an analysis of the site of his condition- the prison-house of
envy-and of the chief instrument and symptom of that condition-the eye,
which can be either a radiant orb or the instrument of invidious calculation and

3 Nietzsche makes such distinctions in Human, All-Too-Human, Part Two, II (The Wanderer
and His Shadow): 29. John Rawls draws the same distinctions in A Theory ofJustice, Cambridge, Har

comparison.

vard University Press, 1971, p. 53 3.

But how can the youth, or any of us, purify his eye? At this point

4 Rawls, p. 532.

Zarathustra's advice may seem distressingly vague. The problem, he is sug
gesting, is not so much that of escape but of a radical change in which one

5 "On Radiant Virtue" (Von der scbenkenden Tugend). Metaphorical discourse is not the only

: arious tropes

would no longer be on the lookout for the guards and other prisoners in the

form of poetic-philosophical language in Zarathustra. For an attempt to sort out the

prison-house of envy. But such a change, or rather the description of what such

or figures in this work see Gary Shapiro, "The Rhetoric of Nietzsche's Zarathustra," tn Pbrlosopbtcal

Style, Berel Lang, ed., Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 1980,pp. 347-385.

a change would be like, will require the teachings of the will to power and the
eternal recurrence which can ground and enable the metaphorical accounts of

6 I have generally followed Hollingdale's translation, occasionally cited as

the virtues and vices which Zarathustra is giving in this early pan of the book.
Perhaps the best that can be done rhetorically is to depict, as Zarathustra does

7 Human, All-Too-Human, Part Two, I (Mixed Opiniom and Maxims) 53.

in a final warning, the final terms in the involuted spiral on which the envious

8 Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, Michael Glenny and Betty Ross trs.,

man is launched. The noble men who lose their highest hopes, he says, become

New York, Harcourt, Brace

slanderers of all hope. This is a pattern which has already become familiar in
our analysis. But here it is advanced as a terrible possibility for the youth to
human nature. "Do not reject the hero in your soul!" may be somewhat

Nietzsche sometimes praises envy, as in the essay on "Homer's Contest."

1970, pp. 106·110.

advertising one's misfortunes, see Human, All-Too-Human, Part Two, I: 304,310,334.
10 I take this to be the sense of Human, All-Too-Human, One, 503: "Envy andfea/nusy. -En·

trite- Walter Kaufmann calls it "advice for adolescents"-but it may also be the

Such praise of envy seems almost always to resolve itself into a celebration of

& World,

9 For some prudential advice on how to avoid envy by hiding one's advantages and

whom Zarathustra speaks, not as a general but rather impersonal point about

appropriate thing to say.

Z.

r

�

�

vy and jealousy are the pudendaScbamu ik of the human soul. The omparison m y perhaps be car·
ried further." That is, these attitudes not only are shameful but are 10 fact generanve; they help the
soul to reproduce itself by instilling similar attitudes in others.
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11 Cited by Shoeck, pp. 50-51. For a general account of the anthropological literature on

envy see George M. Foster, "The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior," Current An

thropology, XIII 1972, pp. 165-202. I do not mean to suggest that envy is limited to peasant
societies or to the lower economic strata; one can find abundant evidence of it in mainly elite white
male institutions such as the university.
12. Human, All-To()-Human, Part Two, II: 244 ("The Fox of Foxes").
13

The Gay Science,

207.

14 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, Patrick Gregory, Baltimore, John Hopkins Universi

ty Press, 1977.
15 Human, All-Too-Human, Part One, 162.
16 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Alan Sheridan tr., New York, Vintage Books,
1979.

